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INTRODUCTION 
American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,1 last term’s
blockbuster Supreme Court copyright case, represents a collision of 
the old and the new. That’s true obviously of the technologies at 
issue: Aereo took television programs broadcast over the air via 
radio waves—the revolutionary technology of the mid-twentieth 
century—and converted them to an Internet-based video stream—the 
revolutionary technology of the early twenty-first century.2 But more 
than a simple clash of technologies, or even business models, was at 
issue. Aereo represented the reemergence of an old copyright 
problem, public performances, and the devilish complexities of a 
new one, automated content creation and delivery. And neither 
reached a satisfying result. 
The old problem is one that has existed at least since Congress 
expanded the public performance right in 1909 to encompass musical 
                                                
 * Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
2. See id. at 2503. 
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works.3 Prior statutes primarily defined infringement as reproduction 
in copies.4 Copyright thus regulated primarily printing and 
publishing, activities that in the nineteenth century were hardly 
subtle or fleeting. But with the addition of public performance rights 
for musical works, this state of affairs changed. Courts were 
confronted for the first time with the question of what the minimal 
human action giving rise to copyright liability might be. Is clicking 
the on/off switch on a radio enough?5 Is someone who turns on a 
receiver sufficiently interacting with a work that we can say 
“performing” it? 
Almost as soon as answers to those questions began to emerge, 
another problem arose. Whatever the minimal human interaction 
necessary to invoke copyright’s protections, humans are increasingly 
being pushed to the sidelines. With the rise of the networked 
personal computer, interactions with creative works more and more 
result from the operation of complex machines or automated 
services. If a machine is programmed to take certain steps after 
receiving some sort of command, who is responsible for what it 
does: the programmer, the owner, the user, or some combination of 
all of them? 
The Aereo service, retransmitting broadcast television over the 
Internet, sat somewhere betwixt the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, and consequently raised both sorts of questions. That may 
have made it more difficult for the Court to satisfactorily address 
either. With respect to the first issue, the minimal acts for direct 
liability, Aereo argued that even if its actions were performances, 
they were not public performances and thus did not cross the line 
that Congress had drawn between infringing and noninfringing acts.6
With respect to the second issue, Aereo argued that because the 
programs were transmitted at the behest of users, it was not 
performing at all, publicly or privately.7
                                                
3. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 
1075, 1075-76, repealed by Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)). 
4. See, e.g., Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (providing 
exclusive rights of “printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, 
finishing, . . . vending,” dramatizing, and translating most works).  
5. The addition of the first public performance right in 1856 for dramatic 
works, Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 138-39, did not raise this sort of 
question. A performance of a play is quite literally a production, and not something 
undertaken on a whim or without forethought. See id.  
6. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507-08. 
7. Id.
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The answer to the first question in Aereo is of considerable 
interest to copyright lawyers and scholars, but perhaps few others. It 
ties up a loose thread from the 1976 Act’s attempted solution to the 
old problem, which was a long and convoluted definition of public 
performance. But the answer to the second question is potentially 
more far-reaching than that. Machine interactions are increasingly 
common in everyday life, and the extent to which humans may be 
held responsible for what they do is unclear. Are humans responsible 
for civilians killed by automated drones in a conflict zone?8 For 
unreasonable force employed by security robots?9 For pedestrians hit 
by driverless cars?10 For search engine results or newspaper articles 
produced by an algorithm?11 The Aereo case is significant for what it 
says, or more precisely does not say, about this emerging issue. 
I. THE OLD PROBLEM: PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 
Aereo launched its service in 2012.12 The idea was to provide a 
remote DVR service for broadcast television that would be 
accessible over the Internet. For a monthly fee of $12, subscribers 
living within one of Aereo’s service areas (initially only New York 
City) would be able to designate any program broadcast over the air 
in that area for recording and later playback on their computers, 
tablets, or smartphones, similar in operation to a DVR and a 
television set. In addition, Aereo offered a “Watch” service, which 
allowed subscribers to immediately play back a recording as it was 
being made, permitting nearly live viewing of broadcast television 
                                                
8. See John Markoff, Fearing Bombs That Can Pick Whom to Kill, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/ 
science/weapons-directed-by-robots-not-humans-raise-ethical-questions.html.
9. See Rachel Metz, Rise of the Robot Security Guards: Startup 
Knightscope Is Preparing to Roll Out Human-Size Robot Patrols, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Nov. 13, 2014), www.technologyreview.com/news/532431/rise-of-the-robot-
security-guards/. 
10. See Claire Cain Miller, When Driverless Cars Break the Law, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/upshot/when-driverless-cars-
break-the-law.html. 
11. See Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436, 438-39 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Stuart Benjamin, If an Algorithm Generated This Post, Is It First 
Amendment Speech?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/18/if-an-
algorithm-generated-this-post-is-it-first-amendment-speech/. 
12. See Brian Stelter, New Service Will Stream Local TV Stations in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/02/14/new-service-will-stream-local-tv-stations-in-new-york/. 
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on digital devices.13 Aereo described its service as essentially an 
antenna, a Slingbox, and a remote DVR.14
Aereo provided these services without paying for any sort of 
license from copyright owners.15 Its system was constructed in order 
to take advantage of a 2008 Second Circuit decision, Cartoon 
Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,16 commonly known as the 
Cablevision case. The case involved a service provided by the cable 
operator Cablevision known as the “‘Remote Storage DVR,’” or RS-
DVR.17 Offered as an optional addition to its normal cable service, 
the RS-DVR provided subscribers with individually allocated storage 
space located on servers at Cablevision’s head ends. Subscribers 
purchasing the RS-DVR service could select programs to save to that 
storage space, and later play them back, using their cable box remote 
and an on-screen menu that operated much like an ordinary DVR. 
The difference was that instead of the remote sending commands to a 
DVR physically located in the home, the Cablevision remote sent 
commands to the cable box, which in turn relayed them to the RS-
DVR servers at the Cablevision head end. The whole system 
functioned like a virtual DVR.18
The Second Circuit held, in fact, that for copyright purposes 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR service was just a virtual DVR. 
Consequently, the copies of the programs that were made were the 
result of the subscribers’ actions, and not Cablevision’s, just as they 
would on a rented DVR. And the performance that resulted when a 
subscriber played back that recording, even if it could be attributed 
to Cablevision,19 was a private performance, not a public one, 
because only the subscriber could receive it. In particular, the 
Cablevision court concluded that “because the RS-DVR system, as 
designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a copy 
made by that subscriber, we believe that the universe of people 
capable of receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single 
                                                
13. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014). 
14. See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 691-92 n.13 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
15. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
16. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
17. Id. at 124. 
18. Id. at 124-25. 
19. The Cablevision court did not reach the question, addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Aereo, of who might be responsible for the performance. See id. at 
134. 
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subscriber whose self-made copy is used to create that 
transmission.”20
Aereo similarly designed its system to create unique copies of 
works, captured with a single, tiny antenna assigned to one 
subscriber at a time; stored in individually allocated server space at 
the direction of the subscriber; and retransmitted only to that 
subscriber upon the subscriber’s request.21 And it made available to 
its subscribers only broadcast channels available over the air at their 
service address.22 Nevertheless, within a month after its launch, 
several broadcast television stations sued Aereo and requested a 
preliminary injunction.23 The preliminary injunction motion, 
however, focused only on a single aspect of Aereo’s business: its 
“Watch” service, under which subscribers could choose to watch 
broadcast television programs nearly live, streamed from the 
subscriber’s DVR storage space only a few seconds after the 
recording had commenced.24 The key issue was whether that nearly 
live transmission, initiated by the subscriber using a service set up 
and maintained by Aereo, was a “public performance” under the 
1976 Act. The district court and the Second Circuit, citing 
Cablevision, held that it was not.25 But the Supreme Court had yet to 
rule on the issue and indeed had not ruled on the definition of public 
performances since before the 1976 Act passed.26 The question 
                                                
20. Id. at 137.  
21. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014). 
22. Id. Aereo’s decision to limit subscribers to those living within the 
broadcast service areas of the television stations constrained its revenues, but 
allowed it to make an argument that it was entitled to a compulsory license under § 
111. See id. at 2506. Unfortunately for Aereo, a Second Circuit panel and the 
Copyright Office had previously rejected that argument, see WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc.,
691 F.3d 275, 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2012), and by the time Aereo seriously pursued it—
after the Supreme Court decision—it was too late. Aereo folded in November 2014. 
See Joe Mullin, After a 3-Year Copyright Battle, Aereo Gives Up the Ghost, ARS 
TECHNICA (Nov. 21, 2014, 10:37 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/11/after-long-court-fight-aereo-files-for-bankruptcy/. 
23. See Stelter, supra note 12; Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 
2d 373, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y 2012).  
24. See Aereo, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376-77.  
25. See id. at 375; WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
26. The Court’s last pronouncement on the issue was Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), holding that a fast-food restaurant did 
not “perform” musical works by tuning an ordinary radio connected to four 
speakers. Id. at 162. 
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before the Court had two components to it: What is a “performance,”
and what does it mean for a performance to be “public”? 
A. Retransmission as Performance 
The traditional copyright question at issue in Aereo—what 
actions constitute a public performance—has a long history that is 
only partly captured in the opinion. That history dates all the way 
back to the 1910s, shortly after the public performance right for 
musical works was adopted.27 A public performance right is a way of 
measuring the commercial value of a work when that value is not 
well correlated to the number of copies of the work that are made. 
Scripts for plays are a good example; the same number of copies 
may generate either very little revenue, if the play is a flop, or a great 
deal of revenue if it is a blockbuster, and both playwrights and 
theater producers are often unable to predict in advance which it will 
be. A public performance right lets the copyright owner share in the 
profit to the degree the work is successful. Music began to take on 
similar characteristics at the turn of the twentieth century, when the 
playing of music turned from being a pastime for family pianists to 
part of an emerging mass culture.28 The popularity of a song for 
playing on pianos in the home could be measured in copies sold, but 
the popularity of a song that captured the zeitgeist so thoroughly it 
was played everywhere could not. 
Although seemingly an incremental extension of copyright for 
musical works, the addition of the public performance right 
unleashed a sea change in copyright practice. Copyright broke free of 
the domain of publishers, printers, novelists, and theaters, and 
suddenly became a concern for hotel owners, nightclub owners, 
dance halls, restaurateurs, and many others who had never had to 
worry about copyright licenses before.29 Those proprietors found the 
sudden shift in copyright’s scope difficult to accept, and their 
resistance set off an arms race of sorts.30 Business owners tried to 
                                                
27. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 
1075, repealed by Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)).
28. This transformation is explained in DAVID SUISMAN, SELLING SOUNDS:
THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN MUSIC 9-11 (2009). 
29. See, e.g., Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 593-94 (1917) (holding 
that music played for ambience in a restaurant is a performance “publicly for 
profit”).
30. SUISMAN, supra note 28, at 170-75. 
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find ways of evading the need for a license, such as delegating music 
selection to independent contractors, and music publishers and courts 
in turn fortified other doctrines, such as secondary liability, to 
compensate.31 By the late 1930s, business owners prevailed upon 
several state legislatures to attempt to ban performance license 
enforcement, with mixed success.32
The public performance right for music was disruptive in 
another way, one that did not become apparent until the 1920s. The 
demarcation line for incurring copyright liability was until then fairly 
thick. In the nineteenth century, direct infringers were liable only for 
publishing or printing material that copied from another, or for 
producing an infringing play.33 In other words, infringement took 
substantial time, money, and effort, and it consisted for the most part 
of acts of production. But the public performance right in music 
could be infringed by anyone who knew how to play a piano. 
Infringement could consist simply of acts of communication.34 And 
by the 1920s, it could be accomplished by anyone who knew how to 
flip a switch. 
The occasion for this debate was the early twentieth century’s
revolutionary technology: radio. Courts almost immediately held that 
broadcasting musical works was a public performance for profit.35
                                                
31. The history is recounted in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.,
316 F.2d 304, 307-09 (2d Cir. 1963). The vast majority of the cases cited in Shapiro, 
Bernstein date from the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Id. at 305-09.
32. The Supreme Court held in Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 394-95, 404-
05 (1941), that such laws were not preempted, but their impact was muted when 
federal courts refused to dismiss infringement actions in federal court based upon 
alleged violations of state laws. See Interstate Hotel Co. v. Remick Music Corp., 157 
F.2d 744, 747-49 (8th Cir. 1946); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 975-76
(7th Cir. 1943); Leo Feist, Inc. v. Demarie, 16 F. Supp. 827, 828 (W.D. La. 1935). 
This feud between business owners and music publishers has not yet received a full 
account in modern scholarship. 
33. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (granting copyright 
owners “the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, 
executing, finishing, and vending the same; and in the case of a dramatic 
composition, of publicly performing or representing it, or causing it to be performed 
or represented by others; and authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to 
translate their own works”).
34. Performance by a human player, such as a musician, singer, or actor, 
also involves acts of interpretation and creation that make precise delineation of the 
relationship between the work and a performance of the work difficult. See Rebecca 
Tushnet, Performance Anxiety: Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 210 (2013).
35. See M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 
(D.N.J. 1923).  
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What about receiving music played over the air? Playing a musical 
instrument, even a player piano, allows some opportunity to control 
the selection of songs or the choice of whether to play music at all; 
but tuning a radio does not. But if the public performance right did 
not apply, then a bar or restaurant owner could easily avoid the result 
of cases such as Herbert v. Shanley Co.36 by tuning in to a licensed 
radio station.  
The Supreme Court resolved this dispute, to some extent, in its 
1931 decision in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.37 The unanimous 
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brandeis,38 rejected the 
contention that receiving a radio broadcast is not a performance. The 
case involved a hotel owner who had wired its building with 
speakers and connected them to a radio receiver. On at least some 
occasions it tuned the radio to a station that played certain songs in 
the ASCAP catalog without a public performance license. The hotel 
owner argued that, by merely tuning a radio, it had not “performed”
under the Act, let alone performed “publicly for profit.” But the 
Court rejected this argument.39 It was unmoved by the argument that 
the copyright owner had a sufficient remedy against the broadcaster, 
because nothing in the statute limited the public performance right to 
a single contemporaneous performance,40 although the Court 
reserved the question of whether a license might be implied if the 
broadcast had been authorized. The Court found it immaterial that a 
radio owner does not get to select the songs, because neither does a 
dance hall owner who hires a band. 
The Jewel-LaSalle Court also rejected the analogy that a 
recipient of a radio broadcast is merely a type of listener to the 
original performance, rather than itself a performer, for two reasons. 
First, the Court observed that the hotel was not simply helping 
listeners to hear a performance they were already receiving, for 
example by amplifying faint sounds; it was providing them with a 
performance that was otherwise beyond their abilities to receive.41
                                                
36. 242 U.S. 591, 593-95 (1917). 
37. 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
38. Id. at 195. Justice Brandeis’s opinion reveals a good grasp of the 
underlying technology, a technology that was essentially the Internet of its time. See 
id. at 199-201. 
39. Id. at 198. 
40. Id. (“[N]othing in the [A]ct circumscribes the meaning to be attributed 
to the term ‘performance,’ or prevents a single rendition of a copyrighted selection 
from resulting in more than one public performance for profit.”).
41. See id. at 200-01 (analogizing conveying performance by radio to 
conveying performance by phonograph). 
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Second, the hotel’s acts in piping the broadcast throughout its 
building revealed that it had its own purpose beyond enabling “better 
hearing of the original program.”42 The hotel was not assisting 
listeners in hearing music that they had chosen to hear; rather, the 
relevant choices—whether to listen to music at all, and if so what 
station—were being made by the hotel. “There is no difference in 
substance,” the Court concluded, “between the case where a hotel 
engages an orchestra to furnish the music and that where, by means 
of the radio set and loud-speakers here employed, it furnishes the 
same music for the same purpose. In each the music is produced by 
instrumentalities under its control.”43 The Jewell-LaSalle Court thus 
appeared to embrace a notion of performance as either involving a 
certain amount of translation in conveying copyrighted works, such 
as converting from radio waves to sound, or perhaps a certain 
purpose for the conveyance—the conveyance of radio as a substitute 
form of providing music. One might call this the “translation test”
and the “control test” for what constitutes a performance. 
Three decades after Jewell-LaSalle, the Court shifted to the 
opposite view: Mere conveyance, no matter what form it took or for 
what purpose, was not enough. In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc.,44 the Court was faced with yet another new 
technology, cable television. The cable system at issue in Fortnightly
was an early one; it merely used an antenna to pick up broadcast 
television signals, which it retransmitted to its customers’ receiving 
sets over wires. The Court could therefore have distinguished Jewell-
LaSalle on the basis of both the “translation test” and the “control 
test.” The hotel owner in Jewell-LaSalle did more than simply 
retransmit the signal; it used its own equipment to choose the 
particular station, receive its transmissions, and convert them to 
audible sound as a substitute for live music. Fortnightly, by contrast, 
merely carried signals to its customers and let them select the station 
to be tuned, or whether any station would be tuned at all. It was, in 
Jewell-LaSalle’s terms, merely aiding its subscribers’ television sets 
in “listening” to broadcast signals. 
But instead, the Fortnightly Court essentially overruled Jewell-
LaSalle.45 In the Fortnightly Court’s view, receiving a broadcast does 
                                                
42. Id. at 201. 
43. Id.  
44. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
45. Specifically, Jewell-LaSalle was “limited to its own facts;” namely, that 
the radio station in that case did not have a public performance license. Id. at 397 
n.18. Since broadcasters without performance licenses are rare, and the existence of 
494 Michigan State Law Review  2015:485 
not perform it, no matter what the circumstances are. Rather, a 
performance is a communication between two parties, a speaker and 
a listener, and only the speaker is a performer. And in order to 
qualify as a speaker, some degree of choice over the content is
necessary: “The broadcaster selects and procures the program to be 
viewed. . . . He then converts the visible images and audible sounds 
of the problem into electronic signals, and broadcasts the signals at 
radio frequency for public reception. . . . Broadcasters perform. 
Viewers do not perform.”46
Jewell-LaSalle had rejected the defendant’s argument that 
some amount of choice over the content is necessary for a 
performance, because, the Court held, selecting a radio station is 
equivalent in terms of choice to hiring a band.47 Fortnightly,
however, made the absence of choice over the particular content 
critical.48 This was made clear six years later, in Teleprompter Corp. 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,49 when the Supreme Court 
held that even importing distant television signals—those beyond the 
range of reception with antennas—would not be held to be a 
performance.50 Once again, the debate centered on the correct 
functional analogy. The dissent found the importation of remote 
television station signals to be “[i]n any realistic practical sense . . .
performing a broadcast function.”51 But the majority opinion, again 
written by Justice Stewart, found “reception and rechanneling of 
these signals for simultaneous viewing,” no matter what the distance, 
to be “essentially a viewer function.”52 Critical to this determination 
was the majority’s conclusion that the cable operators did not 
exercise sufficient choice over the content to turn conveyance into 
performing: “Even in exercising its limited freedom to choose among 
                                                                                                      
an upstream license is irrelevant to determining whether tuning a radio is 
performing, this was tantamount to overruling Jewell-LaSalle. See id. at 406 n.5 
(Fortas, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 397-98 (majority opinion) (footnotes omitted).  
47. This analogy seems flawed; the Jewell-LaSalle Court appeared to 
conflate direct and secondary liability. In the restaurant or nightclub example, either 
the band members are employees of the owner, in which case their choices of music 
are attributable to their employer, or the band members are independent contractors, 
in which case the owner is not directly liable at all for their performances, but is at 
most indirectly liable for providing the means or opportunity to infringe. 
48. Id. at 400-01. 
49. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
50. Id. at 408. 
51. Id. at 417 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
52. Id. at 408 (majority opinion).  
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various broadcasting stations, a CATV operator simply cannot be 
viewed as ‘selecting,’ ‘procuring,’ or ‘propagating’ broadcast signals 
as those terms were used in Fortnightly.”53 In terms of the two tests 
used in Jewell-LaSalle, “translation” was irrelevant, and the type of 
“control” required was control over the content, not control over the 
signal. 
That was the state of the law when Congress passed the 
Copyright Act of 1976. Although most of the text of the 1976 Act 
was finalized in 1964,54 debate over several provisions delayed final 
passage of the revision bills. How copyright should treat cable 
television retransmission had been a particular sticking point.55 The 
solution Congress finally arrived at was to define “perform”
incredibly broadly, define “publicly” somewhat more narrowly, and 
limit the impact of the public performance right through exceptions56
and a compulsory license for cable operators,57 subject to whatever 
the Federal Communications Commission might do to regulate the 
relationship between cable and broadcast television.58
Congress’s definition of “perform” entirely abandoned the 
distinction drawn in Fortnightly between speaking and listening, and 
indeed even the “control test” from Jewell-LaSalle. “To ‘perform’ a
work,” according to the 1976 Act, is “to recite, render, play, dance, 
or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in 
the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its 
images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.”59 Any act of “rendering” or “playing” a work using a 
device, whether for purposes of viewing or not, is a performance 
under the Copyright Act. And the definition of “perform . . . 
‘publicly’” makes clear that transmissions are themselves 
performances—if they were not, then there would have been no need 
to define when such transmissions are public performances.  And 
                                                
53. Id. at 410. 
54. Compare H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. (1964), and S. 3008, 88th Cong. 
(1964), with Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2598-600 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)).  
55. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 
402 n.33 (1968); id. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
56. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 110, 114(a), 116, 118(c). 
57. See id. § 111. 
58. The House Judiciary Committee report specifically cautioned the FCC 
“not to rely upon any action of this Committee as a basis for any significant changes 
in the delicate balance of regulation in areas where the Congress has not resolved the 
issue.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976). 
59. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (setting out the definition of “perform”).
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there  would  also  have  been  no  need  for § 111 of the Copyright 
Act, which provides a compulsory license for cable operators for the 
programs they retransmit from over-the-air broadcast stations.60 The 
House Judiciary Committee report, long regarded as the authoritative 
guide to interpreting the 1976 Act,61 confirms the breadth of the 
definition of performance, offering as examples that:  
a singer is performing when he or she sings a song; a broadcasting 
network is performing when it transmits his or her performance . . . ; a 
cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to 
its subscribers; and any individual is performing whenever he or she . . . 
communicates the performance by turning on a receiving set.62
“Performance” under the 1976 Act thus depends only on the 
“translation” test from Jewell-LaSalle—performance is an activity by 
which a work is converted from one form to another for 
contemporaneous conveyance to an audience. There have been very 
few litigated disputes after the 1976 Act over what constitutes a 
performance; most of the time when there is a dispute over a public 
performance, the issue is whether it is sufficiently “public.”63 Indeed, 
even in Aereo, despite Justice Scalia’s professed skepticism that 
Congress really meant to overrule Fortnightly and Teleprompter,64
there was actually no dispute on the question of performance. The 
Aereo Watch service, Justice Scalia concluded, “undoubtedly results 
in a performance.”65 The question, however, “is who does the 
performing.”66 That is the question on which the majority and the 
dissent actually split, and it represents not a reemergence of the old 
Jewell-LaSalle versus Fortnightly debate, but rather an entirely new 
                                                
60. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012). 
61. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505-06 (2014). 
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Aereo, characterized the House Judiciary Committee 
report as merely “a single report issued by a committee whose members make up a 
small fraction of one of the two Houses of Congress.” Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Whatever the merits of Justice Scalia’s views on legislative history for 
more modern enactments, cf. David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The 
Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 913-
14, 990 (2002), applying that view to the 1976 Act would overturn four decades of 
judicial practice on how to interpret the Act. 
62. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63. 
63. See, e.g., Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507-08 (majority opinion).  
64. See id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Teleprompter Corp. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968)).
65. Id. at 2512. 
66. Id.
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debate that extends well beyond copyright law: When are humans 
responsible for what a programmed machine does? 
B. Retransmission to the Public 
Before addressing the volition issue, however, there is a second 
component of the traditional debate to consider. Having defined 
“perform” so broadly in the 1976 Act, Congress inserted a definition 
of “publicly” that would limit the application of the public 
performance right. That definition has two components: a clause for 
performances occurring in physical spaces and a clause for 
performances that are electronically transmitted. Under the first 
clause, a performance is public if it is made “at a place open to the 
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside 
of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is 
gathered.”67 While the second half of this clause bases the publicness 
of the performance in part on the size of the audience, the first does 
not—a performance is public if it is made at Grant Park with only a 
handful of strangers present.68
The second clause is the one at issue in cases such as Aereo and 
Cablevision. Under the second clause, to “publicly perform” means: 
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the work to a 
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or 
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate places and at 
the same time or at different times.69  
This second clause is a bit confusing, to say the least, because it 
defines a performance as including a transmission of some other 
performance, and provides that the transmission is a public 
performance if the underlying performance is “to the public.” This 
leaves it somewhat unclear what that underlying performance is. 
                                                
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
68. The close cases under the first clause involve some sort of space that is 
temporarily rented out to members of the public. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 
v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1984). Is that a place open to the 
public, because anyone can rent it, or a private space, because once it has been 
rented, no one else may enter? Courts have essentially determined that it depends on 
the purpose of the rental; if the primary purpose of the rental is to watch a 
performance, then it is a place open to the public, and if not, then it is private. 
Compare Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d at 159, and Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986), with Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. 
Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 282 (9th Cir. 1989). 
69. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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In the Cablevision case, the networks argued that the 
underlying performance was the transmission of the copyrighted 
program by the networks to Cablevision, and since any of 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR subscribers who recorded it were capable of 
receiving that performance of the program, the performance those 
subscribers received was “to the public.”70 Cablevision, however, 
argued that that the underlying performance was the rendering of a 
particular copy of the program, and that therefore, since only a single 
subscriber could receive the rendering of that copy, then the 
performance was not “to the public.”71 The Second Circuit agreed 
with Cablevision, concluding that the networks’ argument led to an 
absurd result: If a copyright owner simultaneously transmits a 
program to two different recipients, one of whom retransmits it to its 
subscribers and the other of whom merely retransmits the program to 
itself, both are engaged in “public performances,” since members of 
the public were able to receive the original transmission.72 This, the 
Second Circuit concluded, “obviates any possibility of a purely 
private transmission.”73
But the Second Circuit’s interpretation has oddities as well. It 
limits public performances by transmission to broadcasts and 
sequential playback from a single copy, even though no such 
limitation is implied by the text of the Act.74 If the creation of another 
copy is all it takes to turn a public performance into a private one, 
then the public performance right is incredibly simple to evade for 
subscription services. For example, a cable company or a web-
streaming company could simply add an automatic two-second 
buffer before every stream or on every subscriber’s line, and the 
performance would no longer be public under the Second Circuit’s
definition. And a copy is no more an obvious source for an 
underlying “performance” than a prior transmission is. 
                                                
70. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
71. Id. at 135.
72. Id. at 136. This criticism can be evaded if the focus is put on the 
audience for the performance embodied in a particular transmission, namely, the 
network’s transmission to Cablevision. But the problem then becomes one of 
justifying why that choice of focus is not arbitrary. 
73. Id.
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. For example, it would surely be a public 
performance for a group of cable operators to purchase thousands of copies of a 
DVD, set up a circulating library, and operate an unlicensed video-on-demand 
service by showing them one at a time to paying subscribers. 
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The majority opinion in Aereo resolved this debate by 
abandoning the search for a single, identifiable underlying public 
performance embodied in transmissions. In ordinary usage, a 
“performance” can refer to a “set of actions,” not simply a single 
rendering from a particular copy.75 Indeed, interpreting 
“performance” as meaning a particular occasion on which a copy is 
played back would be inconsistent with the statute, which clearly 
envisions a single performance being transmitted “at different 
times.”76 The Aereo majority held that transmissions of a single work 
can be traced to the same “performance,” for purposes of § 101 of 
the Copyright Act, if those transmissions are associated with a single 
“device or process.”77 According to the Court, “retransmitting a 
television program using user-specific copies is a ‘process’ of 
transmitting a performance.”78 Aereo’s entire setup, then, was a 
performance because it was a single process for retransmitting the 
programs it received over the air. Defined that way, the transmission 
was “to the public” because Aereo’s subscribers that had selected the 
particular program to record were “capable of receiving” it, and that 
group constituted “a large number of people who are unrelated and 
unknown to each other”—in other words, members of the public.79
As with the question of whether there was a performance, there 
was no disagreement among the justices on whether the performance 
was public; Justice Scalia’s dissent did not even reach the issue.80
Rather, the Justices split on a much more difficult question; namely, 
just whose performance was it?81 And on that question, both opinions 
failed to grapple fully with the implications of their analysis. 
II. THE NEW PROBLEM: WHO PERFORMS AN 
AUTOMATED TRANSMISSION?
The issue on which Aereo turned actually had no necessary 
connection to public performances. Rather, the issue is how 
copyright law should treat automation. In particular, courts are 
                                                
75. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (2014).  
76. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
77. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing the definition of “transmit”).
78. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
79. Id. As noted above, however, the size of the potential audience is 
irrelevant to a determination of whether the performance is “to the public,” since the 
public can consist of one person unrelated to the performer. See supra Section I.B. 
80. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
81. See id. at 2512. 
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increasingly being asked to rule on the liability of service providers 
or device manufacturers who program a machine with the capability 
to respond to user inputs in certain ways. This issue had its origin in 
the 1970s, when copyright liability for machine-made copies first 
arose as an issue,82 but it has assumed greater urgency beginning in 
the 1990s with the rise of automated computer servers. The Aereo
case represents the first time the Supreme Court has addressed, in the 
copyright context, the extent of a company’s direct liability for what 
its machines do.83
A. The Aereo Case 
Aereo set up a system that connected hundreds of antennas to 
digital broadcast television tuners, which in turn Aereo programmed 
to automatically send at a subscriber’s request broadcast television 
programs to certain space set aside on its servers.84 Subscribers were 
then given allocated space on Aereo’s servers and provided with the 
ability to send commands to the server to redirect programs to that 
space, or play them back from that space. Once set up, Aereo’s
engineers merely maintained the system, but no human employee of 
Aereo had to intervene when subscribers requested programs to be 
recorded or streamed.85
Aereo thus clearly had some involvement in the resulting 
recordings and playbacks, but then so does every equipment 
manufacturer or service provider whose equipment is used to make 
copies or stream content. Dropbox has some involvement in 
subscriber’s ability to store and stream videos from their storage 
space on its servers. A photocopy shop has some involvement in 
customers’ making of copies. Napster had some involvement in the 
ability of its users to make and send copies of sound recordings. In 
general, the question is, when Party A sets up and maintains an 
automated service, and Party B uses it, who is “doing” the actions 
                                                
82. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam); 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419 (1984). 
83. Both Sony, 464 U.S. at 419, and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005), concerned the defendants’ indirect
liability for their users’ actions. 
84. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 378 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
85. See id. at 377-79. 
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that the service performs? There is a spectrum of possibilities to 
choose from: 
(1) A, the person who set up the machine, is responsible; 
(2) B, the person who gave the commands to the machine, is 
responsible; 
(3) Both A and B are responsible for what the machine does; 
(4) No one is responsible for what the machine does.86
It may be difficult to determine for a particular situation which 
of these categories applies. But the criteria for making that decision 
should be easier to identify. In Aereo, the majority and the dissent 
evidently used different criteria because they arrived at different 
outcomes. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion placed Aereo under 
either category 1 or category 3—Aereo is “acting” in the sending of 
transmissions, and the opinion left open whether the subscribers are 
also acting, although presumably they are.87 The critical question for 
the majority is what other services—for example, remote storage 
services—might also satisfy those criteria. Justice Scalia selected 
category 2—only the subscribers act when the transmissions are 
sent.88 The challenge for the dissenting view is the opposite: whether 
there is any automated service that would satisfy the criteria for 
categories 1 or 3, or whether automation in effect entails immunity 
from direct infringement liability. 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion states repeatedly that at least 
one criterion placing a service into category 1 or 3 is the presence of 
some sort of quality that cable companies have.89 Unfortunately, the 
opinion is less than forthcoming about what that quality might be, 
only that Aereo has it. The majority opinion repeatedly states that 
what drives Aereo’s liability in this case is its “overwhelming 
likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments,”90
or “the many similarities between Aereo and cable companies.”91
Whatever the relevant similarities may be, the majority found it did 
“not make a critical difference here” that Aereo’s subscribers, and 
not Aereo, select the particular content to be performed, because it 
                                                
86. This spectrum is similar to the one laid out by Pamela Samuelson to 
answer the somewhat-related question of who authors the output of a computer 
program. See Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-
Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (1986). 
87. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2507 (majority opinion). 
88. See id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
89. See id. at 2507 (majority opinion). 
90. Id.
91. Id.
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was functionally identical to turning a knob on a television set to 
tune to a particular channel.92 The fact that in the cable context the 
signal was constantly present in the wire, waiting to be tuned and 
demodulated, whereas for Aereo’s Internet service the transmission 
did not begin until the subscriber initiated it with a mouse click, was 
irrelevant. The difference was “invisible to subscriber and 
broadcaster alike” and consequently did not “transform a system that 
is for all practical purposes a traditional cable system into” what 
Justice Scalia colorfully described as “‘a copy shop that provides its 
patrons with a library card.’”93
This argument has been widely characterized, including by 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, as “Aereo looks a lot like a cable system, 
therefore it performs.”94 It seems haphazard to categorize a service 
based solely on its appearance to end users. But this may 
misunderstand the source of the majority’s concern. If Aereo is not
publicly performing through the operation of its service, then a trivial 
alteration to cable systems could make cable operators non-
performers as well, which would defeat Congress’s primary purpose 
in adding the transmit clause and § 111 of the Copyright Act. That is, 
given the two-way communications now possible over cable 
systems, it would be a simple matter to have a signal transmitted 
based on an automated response to a press of a button on the remote 
or to have the subscriber’s service turned on after installation 
through an automated telephone menu. It seems precipitous for such 
minor acts of automation to have the legal consequence of entirely 
removing the cable operator’s agency in transmitting programs. 
Even if that was the majority’s concern, however, it was vague 
about where the necessary agency for Aereo and cable systems alike 
comes from.95 Nevertheless, toward the end of the opinion, the 
majority offered a few hints. The majority attempted to limit the 
scope of its opinion by declaring that its analysis did not extend to 
“[q]uestions involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and 
other novel issues,”96 although Justice Scalia is correct that at this 
                                                
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95. Justice Scalia’s dissent is not only biting on this point, but on-target. See
id. at 2516 (“Making matters worse, the Court provides no criteria for determining 
when its cable-TV-lookalike rule applies.”).
96. Id. at 2511 (majority opinion) (quoting Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 34, Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461)). 
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point we mainly have only the majority’s word on that.97 But it also 
tried to suggest a possible basis for distinguishing such other 
services, noting that a service might not be performing if the service 
is “primarily for something other than the transmission of 
copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of content,” and 
would not be performing publicly if all the subscriber retrieved was 
content he or she had uploaded to the service him- or herself.98
Together these caveats suggest that the operator’s intent or the 
structure of the service might be relevant to determining if it, rather 
than just the subscriber, acted in transmitting content, but the Aereo
majority did not explain itself further. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent was based on the volitional act 
requirement from Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services, Inc.99 Aereo is not liable, Justice Scalia 
argued, because “when its subscribers log in, select a channel, and 
push the ‘watch’ button,” it is not the one that sends the 
transmissions at issue; its users are.100 But just as with the majority’s
argument, the difficulty for Justice Scalia is in identifying the 
reasons why that categorization of the situation is correct. Justice 
Scalia does not rely on an argument that it is simply the last person 
to press a button that determines whose volitional act caused the 
performance. Rather, he states repeatedly that what determines 
whether someone setting up a system to record and retransmit 
content has the necessary “volition” is whether that person “selects 
the copyrighted content.”101 And Aereo does not exercise the 
requisite amount of choice over content to be liable for performing it, 
Justice Scalia concluded. Although Aereo decides what channels it 
will carry, it does not decide the programming on those channels, or 
whether any given subscriber will receive those programs. “The key 
point is that subscribers call all the shots: Aereo’s automated system 
does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a subscriber 
                                                
97. See id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 2511 (majority opinion). 
99. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Interestingly, Justice Scalia 
does not cite Netcom, which might indicate the novelty of the doctrine, but does cite 
a treatise. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 3 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:5.50 (2013)). 
100. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512.  
101. Id. at 2513; see also id. (noting there is no liability for a copy shop 
where “the shop plays no role in selecting the content”); id. at 2514 (“In sum, Aereo 
does not ‘perform’ for the sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of 
content.”); id. at 2517 (“Because Aereo does not select the programs viewed by its 
users, it does not perform.”).
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selects the program and tells Aereo to relay it.”102 Justice Scalia 
analogized Aereo to a copy shop that also gives its customers a 
library card; that is, a service that provides the facilities to copy or 
perform and also provides access to a large array of content selected 
by someone else but does not itself choose what will be copied or 
performed.103
There are two difficulties with this argument, however. One is 
that Aereo does make some choices about what content is available 
on its system and what its users will do with it, and that choice is 
greater than Justice Scalia lets on. The copy shop proprietor can 
hardly expect, even if its customers are given library cards, that a 
substantial number of them will choose to undertake the laborious 
task of photocopying even sections of books, let alone entire books. 
And even if they do, there is no telling what they might photocopy 
from the thousands of volumes a library holds. The selection of a 
single library is not much of a selection at all. But Aereo’s choices 
are far more limiting. Not only are there only fifteen broadcast 
television stations in New York City, broadcasting a total of 
approximately fifty programs at any one time, but the entire purpose 
of Aereo’s service is to record and retransmit those programs to 
subscribers. 
That leads to the second difficulty, which is that Justice 
Scalia’s “selection” rule is simply a resurrection of Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter, the decisions Congress specifically set out to overrule 
in the 1976 Act.104 Neither Fortnightly nor Teleprompter, nor any 
other traditional cable system, selected the over-the-air broadcast 
programs it retransmitted; at most, it selected the channels it carried, 
but then, so does Aereo. Justice Scalia, in a footnote, attempted to 
distinguish Fortnightly and Teleprompter on the basis of the fact that 
cable systems are constantly sending the signal carrying television 
programs, whereas a web-based server requires a request, which 
Justice Scalia concluded meant that the cable operator takes 
“affirmative volitional steps” in selecting the programming that 
Aereo does not.105 But the basis for this distinction is opaque. 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter made exactly the same sort of choices 
that Aereo made in selecting the content available on their systems. 
All three set up a system that would allow users to select and watch 
                                                
102. Id. at 2514. 
103. See id.
104. See id. at 2505 (majority opinion). 
105. Id. at 2515 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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programs of their choosing from a set of broadcast television 
channels chosen by the service provider, without any further input 
from the provider. The fact that cable systems work by propagating a 
signal to the subscriber’s television set, which is received when the 
subscriber tunes to it, and Internet Protocol systems work by having 
the user’s computer send a short “request” to the server before the 
packets are sent is utterly irrelevant to the sort of choices that each 
system operator makes in choosing the content available. 
If a modern version of Fortnightly and Teleprompter existed, 
then under the dissent’s theory in Aereo, it would not be performing 
and thus would not need any sort of license. But that would make 
§ 111 of the Copyright Act pointless, as § 111 provides cable 
operators with a compulsory license for retransmitting broadcast 
television—a license they only would need if retransmission was 
infringing.106 Justice Scalia’s resolution of the dispute in Aereo is 
flatly inconsistent with the Act. 
As a result, neither opinion in Aereo satisfactorily explains 
when the provider of an automated service is directly liable for what 
it does. Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia seem agreed that the service 
provider’s choices matter; for Justice Breyer, it is the choices about 
what sort of service to offer, and for Justice Scalia, it is the choices 
about what content to transmit. But neither opinion gives sufficient 
guidance on when those choices will push someone over the 
threshold from not performing to performing. 
B. The Path Forward 
There may be a solution that avoids the slippery slope of 
finding storage sites to be publicly performing, but still gives effect 
to the Copyright Act’s treatment of cable companies. That solution 
looks to both what Justice Breyer believed to be the criteria for 
finding a public performance—the ineffable “qualities” of a cable 
company—as well as Justice Scalia’s preferred criterion, the exercise 
of choice over the content. What separates cable companies from 
other service providers, such as cyberlockers or ISPs, is that they 
select, as the sole source of content for redistribution, audiovisual 
works, and not just any audiovisual works, but works broadcast over 
the air by local television stations, most of which are copyrighted. 
What gives a cable company direct responsibility over even the 
automated responses of its system are the design choices it made in 
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selecting not only the particular type of content, but also a particular 
source for that content, and in putting it on a system where the 
expected use for that content is viewing by subscribers. 
Those choices are minimal choices, to be sure, but copyright 
draws the line at a lot of minimal choices. The test for originality, for 
example, requires only “some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble, or obvious’ it might be.”107 While a selection of all broadcast 
programming in a given geographical area probably would not be 
copyrightable, the combination of that choice and the limited 
capabilities of the system the programming is placed on is enough to 
deem the sending of that content Aereo’s action. In any event, this 
appears to be the only interpretation of the Act that explains why 
cable companies are publicly performing, but not every company 
that streams a file will be. 
And it is surprisingly similar to at least one of the tests Justice 
Louis Brandeis used in 1931 to determine if the defendant hotel in 
that case was performing: the “control” test. The control test from 
Jewell-LaSalle took account of the purpose of the hotel in both 
receiving the radio broadcast and in redistributing it throughout the 
hotel. The hotel was exercising sufficient control over the radio 
broadcast to make the music contained in that broadcast serve its 
distinct purpose, namely, to provide entertainment. Both the nature 
of the content it received from the radio station and the operation of 
the system it had set up were predictable enough to allow the hotel to 
use the act of tuning to the station to substitute for the conveyance of 
music, just as if it had “engage[d] an orchestra to furnish the 
music.”108 Aereo similarly exercised control over both the source of 
the content and what could be done with it in order to offer what was 
essentially a cable television service—again, a form of 
entertainment. But storage sites such as Dropbox do not restrict their 
services to content produced by a particular source in a certain 
format,109 and as a result, the content on their servers is not one that 
could reliably be used by Dropbox for the purpose of entertaining or 
informing its users. Even web hosts, which do provide services that 
are used to entertain or inform, do not meet the control test because 
they are not channeling content of a particular type from a particular 
                                                
107. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.08[C][1] (1990)). 
108. Id. at 201. 
109. Obviously, the source of any uploads is Dropbox’s subscribers, but that 
fact tells Dropbox little about what sort of content the uploads are.
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source onto a system with limited and predictable functionality. It is 
that quality, and that series of choices, that distinguishes Aereo from 
other Internet services and brought it to more closely resemble a 
cable system. 
There is an intriguing parallel between the dispute over Aereo 
and another emerging issue in copyright law: The issue of who 
authors a work that is in part generated by software. Is it the 
software developer, the user, neither, or both?110 It is an issue that 
extends well beyond copyright law and includes, for example, 
whether such computer-generated content is protected under the First 
Amendment, and if so, who can claim that protection.111
As with the answer to the question of who is performing, the 
answer to the question of who is speaking or authoring seems to 
depend on the extent of the influence wielded by a putative author 
over the contents. Specifically, it depends on the extent to which the 
program constrains the user’s options. If the software imposes very 
few constraints, then it is just a toolbox, and the user is clearly the 
source of any protected expression that results.112 For example, when 
a user of a word-processing program creates a document using that 
program, the program developer is not an author of that document.113
But if the software provides only a limited set of options, put in the 
software by the software developer, then the source of the expression 
that results is more likely to be the software developer. For a non-
electronic example, consider a Choose-Your-Own-Adventure story. 
Suppose such a story provides eighty-three different paths through 
the narrative. Even though that makes a Choose-Your-Own-
Adventure story more complex than most narratives, each path was 
                                                
110. See Samuelson, supra note 86, at 1187-91. This issue, dormant for a 
number of years, has recently begun receiving scholarly attention again. See
Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent 
Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5; Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 919, 920-21 (2012). 
111. Interest in the First Amendment issue has also surged in the last two 
years. For recent entries to this debate, compare James Grimmelmann, Speech 
Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014), with Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2014). 
112. I have developed this analysis further in a pair of blog posts. See Bruce 
E. Boyden, Do Video Games Dream of Electric Speech?, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FAC.
BLOG (June 22, 2012), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/06/22/do-video-
games-dream-of-electric-speech/; Bruce E. Boyden, Speech by Proxy, MARQ. U. L.
SCH. FAC. BLOG (June 25, 2012), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2012/06/26/ 
speech-by-proxy/. 
113. Boyden, Do Video Games Dream of Electric Speech?, supra note 112. 
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conceived of and deliberately mapped out by the writer of the books 
in advance. The user’s selection among them is not a significant 
enough amount of choice to turn the user into an author. 
The public performance right under the 1976 Act works 
similarly. Where the user of a service is able to exercise relatively 
unconstrained choice over the content or how it is used, as the user 
of a storage site or a web hosting service does, then any acts of 
reproduction or performance are the user’s, rather than the service’s. 
But where the service operator has significantly constrained those 
choices, by limiting them to a particular type of content from a 
limited number of channels and confining their use to a limited 
number of functions, then the service provider has exercised enough 
agency to make the resulting reproductions or performances its own. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Aereo did not adopt the framework 
suggested above and thus did not develop any guidance for courts to 
apply to situations other than retransmission of broadcast television. 
But the issue of owner responsibility for the actions of automated 
services is certain to arise again, not only in copyright law but in 
other contexts as well, as Internet services become more 
sophisticated and ubiquitous. As frustrating as it may be for 
copyright lawyers, it is perhaps for the best that the Court, lacking 
the grasp of contemporary technology that Justice Brandeis 
possessed, provided only the result for this fact pattern, rather than 
principles to resolve the issue generally. In the meantime, in deciding 
whether the operator of an automated service is directly liable for 
acts undertaken by the service, lower courts would do well to focus 
on the extent of control wielded by the operator in selecting its inputs 
and directing its outputs. 
